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* Numerous law review articles have been written criticizing the excessive use
of and reliance on footnotes by the courts and law review articles. See, e.g., Arthur
Austin, Footnotes as Product Differentiation, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1131 (1987); J.M. Balkin,
The Footnote, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 275 (1989); Mary I. Coombs, Lowering One's Cites: A
(Sort of) Review of the University of Chicago Manual of Legal Citation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1099
(1990) (book review); Christopher W. Lane, Bluebooks, Filled Milk, and Infield Flys:
Deconstruction, the Footnote and a Uniform System of Citation, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
161 (1993) (reviewing THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (15th ed.
1991)); Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38 (1936). Of particular
relevance to this article is Aside, Don 't Cry' Over Filled Milk: The Neglected Footnote Three
to Carotene Products, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1553 (1988), which Lane characterizes as a
"tongue-firmly-in-cheek commentary" on the neglected footnote three to United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). Lane, supra at 162 n.3.
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GEOFFREY R. STONE ET. AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 574 (2d ed. 1991). Although the
author has sympathy for the position expressed in the articles cited herein, such a
discussion is beyond the scope of this note and merely provided the impetus for the
title.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The area of law concerned with the recovery of "economic
losses", attributable to defective products has been called the most
confused area of product liability law.2 The confusion arises from
the extensive overlap of tort and contract based theories of recovery
for losses from defective products.3 In an attempt to alleviate the
confusion, courts have created a doctrine commonly referred to as
the "economic loss doctrine."4 The economic loss doctrine gener-
ally permits recovery only in contract for "economic losses" arising
from defective products, while both contract and tort recovery are
available for "noneconomic losses."5
Eleven years after Minnesota adopted the economic loss doctrine,
the Minnesota Supreme Court all but eliminated the usefulness of
the economic loss doctrine. In 80 South Eighth Street Ltd. Partnership v.
Carey-Canada, Inc.,6 the first economic loss case involving asbestos
contamination, the Minnesota Supreme Court faced facts where tort
1. For a discussion of the difference between "economic" and "noneconomic"
losses, see infra notes 14-84 and accompanying text.
2. David B. Gaebler, Negligence, Economic Loss, and the U.CC., 61 IND. L. J. 593,
593 (1986).
3. Id. See generally James M. Dente, Negligence Liability to All Foreseeable Parties for
Pure Economic Harm: The Final Assault Upon the Citadel, 21 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 587
(1986); William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960). For an economic analysis of the various legal rules that
have been developed to address this conflict, see Heidi A. Irvin & Mark S. Carlson,
Comment, Recovery of Pure Economic Loss in Product Liability Actions: An Economic Compari-
son of Three Legal Rules, 11 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 283 (1988).
4. See, e.g., 80 S. Eighth St. Ltd. Partnership v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 486 N.W.2d
393, 395-96 (Minn. 1992). For a partial list of commentary published on the eco-
nomic loss doctrine, see James E. Moore, Comment, Agristor Leasing v. Spindler:
Economic Loss, Strict Liability and the U.C.C. - What a Mfess, 34 S.D. L. REV. 101, 102-03
n.20 (1989).
5. "Simply stated, the economic loss doctrine holds that one may not recover
economic' losses under a tort theory." Sidney R. Barrett,Jr., Recovery of Economic Loss
in Tort for Construction Defects: A Critical Analysis, 40 S.C. L. REv. 891, 895 (1989).
6. 486 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1992).
[Vol. 19
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remedies were unavailable under existing law.7 Nevertheless, the
court permitted a suit in tort to continue, declaring that costs associ-
ated with maintenance, removal, and replacement of fireproofing
materials containing asbestos were not "economic losses."8 By de-
claring a loss intuitively economic in nature a "noneconomic loss,"
the court retreated from its prior decisions that emphasized the im-
portance of maintaining a role for the Uniform Commercial Code in
commercial transactions. The 80 South Eighth decision, written with
little analysis, left the law unstable.
Four months later, the economic loss doctrine was, for all practical
purposes, laid to rest in Lloyd F. Smith Co. v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc.9 In foot-
note five of the decision, the court stated that the determination of
whether a loss was economic or noneconomic was merely "short-
hand" for determining whether tort or contract law governed.1i
Again, this language signaled a change in the focus of the court's
analysis away from the original emphasis on the nature of the under-
lying transaction rather than the type of recovery the court believed
appropriate. As in 80 South Eighth, the court deviated from prior
practice and supplied little legal analysis. In fact, this abrupt shift
was confined to a single footnote.I
This Note examines the Minnesota Supreme Court's decisions in
80 South Eighth and Lloyd F. Smith and argues that the court's revision
of the economic loss doctrine was an inevitable result of Minnesota
courts' limited use of the economic loss doctrine to expand the area
of tort recovery. After discussing the history and development of the
economic loss doctrine in Minnesota, this Note analyzes the
problems created by the court's decisions in 80 South Eighth and Lloyd
F. Smith and concludes that the "abandonment" of the economic loss
doctrine in footnote five of Lloyd F. Smith is generally insignificant in
terms of future appellate cases and in providing clarification for
cases where contract and tort remedies may apply. Finally, this Note
provides a suggested framework for the doctrine's analysis and
predicts potential results of some Minnesota cases under that
framework.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MINNESOTA'S ECONOMIC Loss DOCTRINE
A. Introduction
In 1981, the Minnesota Supreme Court first addressed situations
7. The court acknowledged that if the losses incurred by the plaintiff were "eco-
nomic losses," recovery would be limited to contract remedies. Id. at 396.
8. Id. at 397.
9. 491 N.W.2d 11 (Minn. 1992).
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where a party may invoke tort theories of negligence and strict prod-
ucts liability to recover economic losses resulting from allegedly de-
fective products. In Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp.,12 the court
held that economic losses arising from commercial transactions are
not recoverable in tort, unless the losses involved personal injury or
damage to "other property."'s Noneconomic losses, on the other
hand, could be recovered under both tort and contract theories. The
Superwood court recognized that the rights and responsibilities of par-
ties to commercial transactions are governed exclusively by the Uni-
form Commercial Code.14
In the years following Superwood, the courts struggled to determine
what constitutes "other property" as described by Superwood. These
cases culminated in Hapka v. Paquin Farms,1 5 a case that eliminated
the "other property" exception by expressly overruling any prior
statement or implication that the Uniform Commercial Code is not
the exclusive determinant of recovery for property damage arising
from commercial transactions. The Minnesota Legislature re-
sponded to Hapka by passing a statute that permits tort recovery for
damage to "other property" arising from the sale of goods, except
where the transaction occurs between parties who are each
merchants in goods of the kind sold.16
The court's consistent concern with retaining a place for the Uni-
form Commercial Code played a significant role in determining the
court's approach to the issues presented in 80 South Eighth. Rather
than retreat from the Hapka court's rejection of the "other property"
exception or rely upon the statutory provision for an "other prop-
erty" exception, the court decided that the losses sought by the 80
South Eighth Partnership were not "economic losses" at all.17 To
reach this conclusion, the court redefined the concept of "economic
loss" and retreated from its historic emphasis on the nature of the
12. 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981), overruled in part by Hapkav. Paquin Farms, 458
N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990). Shepard's Citator Service incorrectly states that the
Superwood case was overruled by Hapka. The supreme court's opinion in Hapka states
that "[t]o the extent Superwood Corp. v. Siemplelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159
(Minn. 1981) and its progeny are inconsistent with the decision [in Hapha], they are
hereby expressly overruled." Id. at 684. But Hapka, in effect, only "overruled the
dictum in Superwood which excepted from the economic loss rule bar those losses
involving personal injury or damage to other property arising from commercial
transactions." Luther P. House, Jr. & HubertJ. Bell, Jr., The Economic Loss Rule: A Fair
Balancing of Interests, CONSTRUCTION LAw., Apr. 1991, at 34.
13. Superwood, 311 N.W.2d at 162.
14. Id.
15. 458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990).
16. MINN. STAT. § 604.10 (1992).
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underlying transaction. The court's opinion rendered the distinction
between economic and noneconomic loss almost indecipherable.
B. The Law Before Superwood
In 1965, two state courts analyzed the economic loss doctrine and
established apparently conflicting rules of law.18 The first of these
cases, Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc.,19 represents the minority
position.20 In Santor, a consumer was allowed to recover the cost of
defective carpeting from the manufacturer under a strict products
liability theory.21 The New Jersey court noted that a manufacturer
represents its product to be suitable and safe for its intended use by
placing the product on the market.22 Strict liability for defective
products arises from this representation and serves as the basis of
recovery for any damage to the property purchased, "other prop-
erty," or persons.23
A short time later, the California Supreme Court decided Seely v.
White Motor Co. 24 Seely involved an allegedly defective truck that was
18. See Moore, supra note 4, at 10 1-03. Moore argues that economic loss case law
is uncertain and lacks clarity because courts refer to the two 1965 cases and reject
one of them without performing any significant analysis of the policy behind these
cases. Id. at 103.
19. 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965).
20. The Santor holding represented a minority view at the time. Superwood was
decided and continues to represent a minority view today. Moore, supra note 4, at
102 n.13.
21. Santor, 207 A.2d at 312. The Santor opinion began by affirming a trial court
decision allowing a recovery for breach of warranty without privity of contract in a
case where there was property damage only. Id. Previously, recovery against manu-
facturers who were not in privity with the consumer were allowed only in cases of
personal injury. Id. at 307-11 (citing Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161
A.2d 69 (NJ. 1960)). Because the Santor decision was upheld on a breach of warranty
basis, the New Jersey Court's decision that the plaintiff could have recovered in tort
was unnecessary.
22. Id. at 311.
23. Id. at 312. The Santor court noted that the purpose of strict liability is to
ensure that the cost of injury or damage, regardless of the nature of the damage, be
borne by the manufacturer rather than by consumers who are generally powerless to
protect themselves. Id. The court did not address whether a similar result would
have been reached in a case involving a commercial transaction. In fact, in Spring
Motors Distrib., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660 (N.J. 1985), the New Jersey
court refused to allow recovery for "economic loss" in a commercial transaction. Id.
at 663.
24. 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965). The California Supreme Court noted that strict
liability was created to govern problems arising in cases of physical injury, not to
undermine the remedies prescribed by the Uniform Commercial Code. Id. at 149.
The court stated that strict liability resulted from a recognition that "[t]he remedies
of injured consumers ought not to be made to depend upon the intricacies of the law
of sales," Id. (citations omitted).
1993]
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purchased for commercial use.25 An accident occurred when the
truck's brakes failed. The owner sued the manufacturer for vehicle
repair costs and lost profits.26 In rejecting Santor's reasoning, the
California court noted that the rules of warranty were sufficient to
meet the needs of parties to commercial transactions.2 7 Seely thus
held that a manufacturer could be liable for the "safety" of a product
as that term relates to unreasonable risks of harm.28 Manufacturers,
however, may not be held liable for failure to meet the consumer's
expectations of performance unless they explicitly accept that re-
sponsibility.2 9 Ultimately, the court concluded that strict liability
should afford protection for damage to property other than the
goods purchased because such damage was so similar to personal
injury that there was no valid reason for distinguishing between the
two types of injury.3o
C. Minnesota Confronts Economic Loss: Superwood Corp. v.
Siempelkamp Corp.31
In confronting the issues raised by the Superwood Corporation,
the Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed both Santor and Seely. The
supreme court rejected the reasoning of Santor and instead chose to
follow the Seely court's interpretation of the competing goals of tort
and contract liability.32 Citing Seely, the Superwood court noted that
the law of sales, enacted through the Uniform Commercial Code,
was designed to meet the needs of parties to commercial transac-
tions.33 In Superwood, the court stated that the goal of the Uniform
Commercial Code was to clarify the rights and remedies of parties to
commercial transactions.34 Among these rights and remedies were
statutory provisions specifically related to warranties, disclaimers,
25. Id. at 147.
26. Id. at 147-48.
27. Id. at 150-51.
28. Id.
29. Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151 (Cal. 1965).
30. Id. at 152.
31, 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981), overruled in part by Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458
N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990).
32. Id. The Superwood decision relied heavily and quoted extensively from Seely
and other cases which rely on it. Superwood involved an alleged defect in a hot plate
press made in 1954. The press operated without incident until 1975 when a cylinder
failed and could not be replaced. Id. at 160. Superwood sued Siempelkamp alleging
negligence, strict products liability, breach of warranty, and breach of contract. Id.
The case focused on whether a manufacturer is strictly liable to the user of equip-
ment damaged by negligent manufacture, inspection, or installation and, if so, which
damages are recoverable. Id.
33. Id. at 161 (citing Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151 (Cal. 1965)).
34. Id. at 162.
[Vol. 19
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and remedies for breach of warranty.3 5 To permit tort liability to
enter into the arena of commercial transactions would allow one
party to get something for which it did not bargain. 36 This analysis
led the court to hold that "economic losses" from commercial trans-
actions are not recoverable in tort except where personal injury or
damage to "other property" was involved.3 7
The Superwood court focused extensively on preserving a role for
the Uniform Commercial Code and on limiting recovery in tort. 38
The Superwood court left open one possibility for plaintiffs seeking
recovery for "economic losses" arising out of commercial transac-
tions. A broad definition of "other property" would permit recovery
in many cases, and much of the litigation that followed Superwood fo-
cused on this exception.
D. Defining "Other Property" and "Economic Loss"
The Minnesota Supreme Court first addressed the "other prop-
erty" exception in Minneapolis Society of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Associ-
ates Architects, Inc. 3 9 In Fine Arts, the court decided whether damage
to a building caused by deterioration in brick constituted damage to
"other property."4o The Fine Arts court held that diminution in the
35. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 336.2-313 to -318 (1992).
36. Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Minn.
1981), overruled in part by Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990). The
Superwood court further stated that "[t]o allow tort liability in commercial transactions
would totally emasculate these [warranty] provisions of the U.C.C."
In dissent, Justice Lawrence Yetka argued that recovery for negligence should be
permitted in commercial transactions. Id. (Yetka,J., dissenting). Yetka based his dis-
sent on three arguments. First, he stated that common law had long permitted negli-
gence actions in commercial transactions and that, absent explicit guidance from the
legislature, the Uniform Commercial Code should not be construed in derogation of
common law. Id. at 162-63. Second, he argued that the remedies provided in the
Code merely supplemented rather than replaced tort recoveries. Id. at 163. Third,
Yetka believed it was inappropriate to hold only sellers of defective products liable in
negligence when someone was injured. Id. Even Yetka, however, would limit recov-
ery for strict liability and not permit it as a basis for recovery of purely economic
injury. Id. at 162. See also SJ. Groves & Sons Co. v. Aerospatiale Helicopter Corp.,
374 N.W.2d 431, 434 (Minn. 1985), overruled in part by Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458
N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990).
37. Superwood, 311 N.W.2d at 162.
38. Id. The court expressed concern that adopting the view expressed in Santor
would result in tort recovery unrestrained by the limitations placed on liability by the
legislature when it adopted the Uniform Commercial Code. The court stated,
"[c]ilearly, the legislature did not intend for tort law to circumvent the statutory
scheme of the U.C.C." Id.
39. 354 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 1984), overruled in part by Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458
N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990).
40. Id. at 817. Fine Arts involved allegations that the manufacturer of glazed brick
used in a remodeling project knew or should have known that the bricks were not fit
for the use which the purchasers intended. Id. at 818. The suit alleged breach of
19931
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value of a building did not constitute damage to "other property" as
contemplated by Superwood and therefore was not recoverable in
tort.4 1 The court noted that "[t]o hold that buildings constitute
'other property' would effectively overrule Superwood as to every
seller of basic building materials .... The U.C.C. provisions as ap-
plicable to component suppliers would be totally emasculated."42
The court also rejected the argument that any damage to "other
property," however small relative to the total damage, should permit
recovery of the entire 1oss.43 The Minneapolis Society of Fine Arts
argued that damage to the mortar resulting from deterioration in the
brick should permit it to recover the full diminution in value of the
building even though the cost of the mortar was nominal in compari-
son to the cost of the brick. 44 The court rejected this argument, not-
ing that to allow a party to sue in tort to recover substantial damages
because of minor damages to "other property" "would thwart the
policy implications of Superwood. '45
Although the Fine Arts case focused on the scope of the "other
property" exception, the court also engaged in a lengthy discussion
of the nature and definition of "economic loss." The court noted
that "economic loss" is generally that loss which results
from the failure of the product to perform to the level expected by
the buyer and commonly has been measured by the cost of repair-
ing or replacing the product and the consequent loss of profits, or
by the diminution in value of the product because it does not work
for the general purposes for which it was manufactured and sold. 46
contract, breach of warranty, negligence, strict products liability, and failure to warn.
Id. at 817.
41. Id. at 821.
42. Id. at 820. In support of its position, the court cited cases from other juris-
dictions where damages to component products resulting in damage to the end prod-
uct were determined to be "economic losses" but not losses to "other property." See,
e.g., R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818, 829 n. 11 (8th Cir.
1983);Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v.Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280 (3d
Cir. 1980); Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., Inc., 572
S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1978). Several law review articles have focused explicitly on strict
liability as it applies to the construction industry. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 5 (criti-
cizing cases which allow recovery for the risk of personal injury); Michael D. Lieder,
Constructing a Vew Action for Negligent Infliction of Economic Loss: Building on Cardozo and
Coase, 66 WASH. L. REv. 937 (1991) (arguing for creation of a new tort for negligent
infliction of economic loss).
43. Fine Arts, 354 N.W.2d at 820 n.4.
44. Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assoc. Architects, Inc., 354
N.W.2d 816, 819 (Minn. 1984), overruled in part by Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458
N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990).
45. Id. at 820 n.4.
46. Id. at 820-21 (citing Comment, Manufacturers' Liability to Remote Purchasers for
"Economic Loss" Damages-Tort or Contract, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 539, 541 (1966); Note,
Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 917, 918 (1966)).
[Vol. 19
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Thus, where damage results from deterioration, internal breakage,
depreciation, or failure to meet the purchaser's expectations, there is
no recovery in tort.4 7 The court noted that some jurisdictions char-
acterize noneconomic losses as injuries that result from a calamitous
event or where a product creates a hazardous condition.48 While not
specifically rejecting these arguments, the court noted that they did
not apply in the Fine Arts case.49
E. Rejecting Other Exceptions to the Economic Loss Doctrine
Just a year after the Fine Arts case, the Minnesota Supreme Court
rejected the "calamitous event" exception to the economic loss doc-
trine in SJ Groves & Sons Co. v. Aerospatiale Helicopter Corp.50 Here, the
court emphasized that the plaintiff buyer was a commercial entity
possessing bargaining power substantially equal to that of the de-
fendant seller and, as such, was capable of negotiating adequate war-
ranty protection.51 The court reaffirmed its decision in Fine Arts,
holding that nominal damage to "other property" was insufficient to
permit tort recovery for damages to the product itself.52 The court
also noted that there were no policy reasons for allowing the plain-
tiff, a commercial entity that could have bargained for allocation of
the risk of loss from defects, to recover in tort for property damage
Several recent publications have provided similar definitions. See, e.g., Barrett, supra
note 5, at 892 n. 1. Barrett also argues that an "economic loss" occurs when a prod-
uct is of inferior quality or does not work for the purpose intended. Id. at 895.
47. Fine Arts, 354 N.W.2d at 821.
48. Id. (citing Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d
1165 (3d Cir. 1981); Sanco, Inc., v. Ford Motor Co., 579 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. Ind.
1984); Industrial Uniform Rental Co. v. International Harvester Co., 463 A.2d 1085
(Pa. 1983); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443 (III. 1982)).
49. Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assoc. Architects, Inc., 354
N.W.2d 816, 819 (Minn. 1984), overruled in part by Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458
N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990).
50. 374 N.W.2d 431, 435 (Minn. 1985), overruled in part by Hapka v. Paquin
Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990). Groves involved a suit for damages to a heli-
copter, radio, and two headsets resulting from a crash which killed the pilot and in-
jured a passenger. Fatigue failure of a component of the collective pitch control
mechanism allegedly caused the crash. Id. at 432. Four questions were certified to
the court in the Groves case. The court was asked if "economic loss" is recoverable in
tort where: (1) loss results from a sudden and calamitous event; (2) one person is
killed and another injured in the event giving rise to the loss; (3) the party claiming
the loss is not the one suffering personal injury; and (4) the damage to "other prop-
erty" is nominal relative to the total losses. Id. at 433. The court answered each of
these questions negatively. Id. at 435.
51. Id. The Groves plaintiff sought purely "economic losses," even though per-
sonal injuries occurred concurrently with the property damage. Id. at 433.
52. The court reaffirmed its previous holding that damages resulting from the
failure of a product to live up to expectations as to suitability, quality, and perform-
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simply because an employee suffered personal injury.53
Two cases decided in 1987 underscored the emphasis the Minne-
sota Supreme Court placed on preserving the role of the Uniform
Commercial Code in determining remedies for losses in commercial
transactions.54 In Valley Farmers' Elevator v. Lindsay Bros. ,55 the court
refused to allow recovery of "economic losses" in a commercial
transaction that involved the sale of both goods and services. The
court applied the "predominant factor" test, which holds that a
transaction involving the sale of both goods and services is governed
by the Uniform Commercial Code if the sale of goods is the primary
reason for the transaction.56
Conversely, in McCarthy Well Co. v. St. Peter Creamery, Inc. ,57 the
court permitted recovery for economic losses where negligent per-
formance of services was involved.58 The effect of these two cases
was to apply the Superwood rule when the sale of goods was the pre-
dominant factor while confining the rule to transactions governed by
the Uniform Commercial Code.59
The Minnesota Supreme Court's consistent focus on the nature of
the underlying transaction led the Minnesota Court of Appeals to
reject the argument that Superwood created a "dangerous defect" ex-
ception to the economic loss doctrine. In Thofson v. Redex Industries,
Inc.,60 the court of appeals stated that the loss of grain stored in a
grain dryer destroyed by fire was not recoverable in tort even if the
defect created an unreasonable danger to persons or "other prop-
53. Id. The court emphasized that where commercial entities which can negoti-
ate to protect themselves subsequently seek tort recovery, they are, in effect, seeking
to better the bargain they negotiated. The court asserted that Groves could have
paid a higher price to obtain the additional warranty protection it was seeking in tort.
Id. (citing Purvis v. Consolidated Energy Prods. Co., 674 F.2d 217, 221 (4th Cir.
1982)).
54. See Noah A. Cashman et al., Note, Uniform Commercial Code. Minnesota Refines
the Superwood Doctrine for Recovery of Economic Damages in Commercial Transactions, 14
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 221 (1988) (discussing in detail Valley Farmers' Elevator v.
Lindsay Bros. Co., 398 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1987), overruled in part by Hapka v. Paquin
Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990) and McCarthy Well Co. v. St. Peter Creamery,
Inc., 410 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. 1987)).
55. 398 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1987), overruled in part by Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458
N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990).
56. Valley Farmers' Elevator, 398 N.W.2d at 556; Cashman, supra note 54, at 224-
25.
57. 410 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. 1987).
58. Id. at 315.
59. See Cashman, supra note 54, at 230. The authors note that the court main-
tained the integrity of the Superwood decision by applying it only to cases evolving
from transactions governed by the Uniform Commercial Code. Id. Any other result,
they imply, would have severely undermined the Superwood doctrine. Id.
60. 433 N.W.2d 901 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
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erty." 6' Moreover, the court noted that damages are only recover-
able in tort when they are not the type that would ordinarily be
contemplated by the parties to the transaction.62 The court rea-
soned that damage to grain would be expected if a grain dryer mal-
functioned, and therefore the grain was not "other property." 63
Fine Arts, S.J. Groves & Sons, Thofson, and other cases decided in the
first decade after Superwood resulted in a serious limitation on the
availability of tort remedies for property damages arising from prod-
ucts purchased in commercial transactions. Courts rejected a pro-
posed exception to the general rule proscribing tort recovery for
"economic losses" for those damages arising from a "sudden and
calamitous event." 64 In addition, the term "other property" was
construed to include only those items not within the contemplation
of the parties to the sale transaction,65 and that "other property"
must be a significant portion of the damages sought in order to rely
on the "other property" exception.66 The court of appeals went
even further, rejecting an exception for products that are "unreason-
ably dangerous."67 The overriding consideration in these limita-
tions was a strong desire to preserve an important role for traditional
contract and Uniform Commercial Code remedies.
F. Overruling the "Other Property" Exception
By 1990, Minnesota courts had interpreted the Superwood's implied
"other property" exception so narrowly that the Minnesota Supreme
Court's explicit rejection of the exception in Hapka v. Paquin Farms68
61. Id. at 903 (citing St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Steeple Jac, Inc., 352
N.W.2d 107, 110 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), review denied (Minn. Jan. 4, 1985)).
62. Thofson, 433 N.W.2d at 903-04 (citing Holstad v. Southwestern Porcelain,
Inc., 421 N.W.2d 371, 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), review denied (Minn. Apr. 28,
1988)).
63. Thofson, 433 N.W.2d at 904.
64. See S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Aerospatiale Helicopter Corp., 374 N.W.2d
431, 435 (Minn. 1985), overruled in part by Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683
(Minn. 1990).
65. See Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assocs. Architects, Inc.,
354 N.W.2d 816, 820 (Minn. 1984), overruled in part by Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458
N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990); see also Thofson v. Redex Indus., Inc, 433 N.W.2d 901,
904 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
66. See, e.g., SJ. Groves & Sons, 374 N.W.2d at 434 n.2; Fine Arts, 354 N.W.2d at
820 n.4.
67. Thofson v. Redex Indus., Inc, 433 N.W.2d 901, 903 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
68. 458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990). The plaintiffs sued for losses suffered from
the purchase of diseased seed potatoes from Paquin Farms. Id. at 685. The diseased
potatoes allegedly infected other crops processed on the same potato cutting
machine. Id. As a result, the plaintiffs' potatoes could not receive state certification
as disease-free seed potatoes. The plaintiffs sought to recover for the lower profits
on the uncertified potatoes, the losses associated with destruction of one field of po-
tatoes, and the costs of cleaning and disinfecting the machinery and warehouses. Id.
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was anticlimactic. Although the Supenvood court implied that tort re-
covery would be available for damages to "other property" and sub-
sequent cases assumed such recovery was available, the supreme
court had never directly confronted the issue in a commercial trans-
action before Hapka. In pre-Hapka cases, the court found other
grounds for denying recovery. 69 In Hapka, the court stated that "the
Uniform Commercial Code must control exclusively with respect to
damages in a commercial transaction which involves property dam-
age only, and any statement or implication to the contrary in
Superwood and its progeny is hereby expressly overruled." 70
The court noted that it would permit some deviation from the rule
in cases where personal injury occurred in commercial and consumer
transactions. 71 However, where commercial transactions resulted in
property damage, the court refused to supplement the Uniform
Commercial Code remedies with negligence and strict liability.72
The Hapka decision represented a retreat from prior law by explic-
itly overruling any exceptions to the economic loss doctrine in com-
mercial transactions other than those based on personal injury.73
The Hapka court characterized the Superwood language that recog-
nized the "other property" exception as unnecessary to the
Superwood holding.74 The Hapka court further noted that the discus-
sion leading up to the holding in Superwood contemplated an excep-
tion for consumer transactions based on unequal bargaining power,
yet the holding was the first place that the Superwood court explicitly
mentioned the "other property" exception.75 Accordingly, the
Hapka court believed that Superwood's recognition of an "exception
applicable to personal injury or damage to other property arising out
69. See S.J. Groves & Sons, 374 N.W.2d at 434 n.2; Fine Arts, 354 N.W.2d at 820
n.4.
70. Hapha, 458 N.W.2d at 688. The court had previously noted that the Uniform
Commercial Code covered all commercial transactions and that the language of the
code indicates that it is intended to displace tort recovery. Id. at 687. The court
pointed to MINN. STAT. § 336.2-719(3) (1992) which states that the exclusion of per-
sonal injury from warranties in the sale of consumer goods is unconscionable.
Hapka, 458 N.W.2d at 688. As in Superwood, Justice Yetka dissented and argued that
the Uniform Commercial Code does not displace the entire field of tort law. Id. at
690 (Yetka, J., dissenting).
71. Hapka, 458 N.W.2d at 688.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 687. The court stated that
[Superwood] simply does not comport with excepting economic losses arising
out of personal injury or damage to other property when the setting in
which the sale occurred was a commercial transaction. Indeed, making tort
theories of recovery available in commercial transactions flies in the face of
the court's recognition of the intended purview of the U.C.C.
Id.
74. Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683, 687 (Minn. 1990).
75. Hapka, 458 N.W.2d at 688.
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of commercial transactions [was] a non sequitur." 76
G. The Legislature Reacts
Hapka resulted in the elimination of tort recovery for economic
loss in any commercial transaction, even if the loss was to property
not involved in the original transaction. The Hapka court noted that
commercial parties are expected to identify risks and negotiate a
price based on the allocation of risk agreed upon at the time of con-
tract formation.77 In 1991, the Minnesota Legislature codified this
judicial result in Minnesota Statutes section 604.10.78
The statute incorporates the pre-Hapka "other property" excep-
tion to all transactions except those between merchants in goods of
the kind.79 The statute provides:
(a) Economic loss that arises from a sale of goods that is due to
damage to tangible property other than the goods sold may be re-
covered in tort as well as in contract, but economic loss that arises
from a sale of goods between parties who are each merchants in
goods of the kind is not recoverable in tort.8 0
76. Id. at 687. The court's assertion is a slight overstatement. Throughout the
Superwood decision, the court referred to the need for strict liability and negligence
theories to protect consumers. Strict liability was developed to "fill gaps in the law of
sales with respect to consumer purchasers." Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp
Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Minn. 1981), overruled in part by Hapka v. Paquin Farms,
458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990) (citations omitted). The Uniform Commercial Code,
on the other hand, was said to "clarifly] the rights and remedies of parties to com-
mercial transactions." Id.
The sentence before the holding in Superwood stated: "[1]imiting the application
of strict products liability to consumers' actions or actions involving personal injury
will allow the U.C.C. to satisfy the needs of the commercial sector and still protect the
legitimate expectations of consumers." Id. (emphasis added). The holding, which
begins a new paragraph, states "[f]or these reasons, we hold that economic losses
that arise out of commercial transactions, except those involving personal injury or damage
to other property, are not recoverable under the tort theories of negligence or strict
products liability." Id. (emphasis added). While the court's statement in Hapka that
the exception for "other property" is a non sequitur is accurate, the Superwood court
did contemplate an exception for personal injury in commercial transactions. How
such a suit would be brought, given the holding in S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Aeros-
patiale Helicopter Corp., 374 N.W.2d 431 (Minn. 1985), overruled in part by Hapka v.
Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990), is at best uncertain.
77. Hapha, 458 N.W.2d at 688.
78. MINN. STAT. § 604.10 (1992).
79. MINN. STAT. § 604.10(a) (1992).
80. Id. The remainder of the statute provides:
(b) Economic loss that arises from a sale of goods, between merchants, that
is not due to damage to tangible property other than the goods sold may not
be recovered in tort.
(c) The economic loss recoverable in tort under this section does not in-
clude economic loss due to damage to the goods themselves.
MINN. STAT. § 604.10(b), (c) (1992).
To date there has been no case law interpreting the statute. The Minnesota
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III. 80 SOUTH EIGHTH and LLOYD F. SMITH
Against this historical and legal backdrop, the Minnesota Supreme
Court decided 80 South Eighth and acknowledged that the existing
paradigm required the court to find tort remedies unavailable.81 In-
stead the court chose to redefine "economic loss" and, in so doing,
declared a type of loss-intuitively economic-to be noneconomic.82
Four months later, in footnote five of the Lloyd F. Smith8s decision,
the court noted that "economic loss" is merely a "shorthand phrase"
for indicating that a loss is recoverable in contract.8 4 By changing
the focus of the court's analysis from a determination of the nature
of a loss to a determination of the preferred theory of recovery, the
court severely modified the economic loss doctrine.
A. 80 South Eighth-The Beginning of the End
The 80 South Eighth Street Limited Partnership purchased a four-
building commercial complex in downtown Minneapolis in 1981.85
The complex, known as the IDS Center, was constructed between
1970 and 1972 using fireproofing that contained asbestos provided
by Carey-Canada Mines Limited, Celotex Corporation, and W.R.
Grace Corporation.8 6 The 80 South Eighth partnership consisted of
Oxford Development Minnesota, Inc., its successors, and the Bell
System Trust. Oxford and its successors, each large commercial real
estate development and management firms, acted as general
partners .87
In 1986 and 1987, 80 South Eighth learned that fireproofing
materials containing asbestos were on the beams and columns of all
Supreme Court was given the opportunity to apply the statute retroactively in both
80 South Eighth St. Ltd. Partnership v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 486 N.W.2d 393 (Minn.
1992) and Lloyd F. Smith Co. v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 11 (Minn. 1992). In
both cases, the court refused to address the issue.
81. 80 S. Eighth St. Ltd. Partnership v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 486 N.W.2d 393, 396
(Minn. 1992).
82. Id. at 397.
83. Lloyd F. Smith Co. v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 11 (Minn. 1992).
84. Id. at 14 n.5.
85. 80 South Eighth, 486 N.W.2d at 394.
86. 80 S. Eighth St. Ltd. Partnership v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 486 N.W.2d 393,
394-95 (Minn. 1992).
87. Id. at 395. The limited partnership purchased the property from Oxford De-
velopment which acquired it in 1981. Id. Oxford Development was a subsidiary of
Oxford Properties, Inc., a Colorado corporation owned by Oxford Development
Group Ltd., a Canadian corporation. The corporation's name was changed to BCED
Minnesota, Inc. Brief of Respondent at 11, 80 S. Eighth St. Ltd. Partnership v. Ca-
rey-Canada, Inc., 486 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1992) (No. CI-91-1427). All of these com-
panies are or were experienced commercial real estate development and
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floors of the IDS Tower, all floors of the IDS annex, and both floors
of the Woolworth building.88 The partnership conducted tests that
showed the fireproofing made by Grace released substantial num-
bers of asbestos fibers even when undisturbed.89 80 South Eighth
then instituted costly maintenance procedures to keep the ceiling
tiles and light fixtures free from asbestos fibers.90
In 1988, the partnership brought suit seeking compensatory dam-
ages for maintenance, removal, and replacement of the asbestos, pu-
nitive damages, and litigation costs. 9 ' Despite the expiration of the
statute of limitations, the suit was allowed pursuant to a 1987 statute
which revived actions against manufacturers or suppliers of asbestos
and asbestos containing materials.92
The suit alleged that the parties responsible for constructing the
building were unaware that the fireproofing materials used contained
asbestos. 9 3 There were no direct claims for personal injury, nor
were there any allegations that any personal injuries had resulted
from the presence of the asbestos. 94
Three questions were certified to the Minnesota Supreme Court
on the issue of liability in negligence and tort.9 5 The court held that
88. 80 South Eighth, 486 N.W.2d at 395.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 80 S. Eighth St. Ltd. Partnership v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 486 N.W.2d 393, 395
(Minn. 1992).
92. MINN. STAT. § 541.22 (1992). The revival statute provides:
Subdivision 1. Findings and purpose. The legislature finds that it is in the
interest of the general public, particularly those persons who may bring
claims regarding materials containing asbestos and those against whom the
claims may be brought, to set a specific date by which building owners must
bring a cause of action for removal or other abatement costs associated with
the presence of asbestos in their building. By enactment of this statute of
limitations the legislature does not imply that suits would otherwise be
barred by an existing limitations period.
Subdivision 2. Limitation on certain asbestos actions. Notwithstanding any
other law to the contrary, an action to recover for (1) removal of asbestos or
materials containing asbestos from a building, (2) other measures taken to
locate, correct, or ameliorate any problem related to asbestos in a building,
or (3) reimbursement for removal, correction, or amelioration of an asbes-
tos problem that would otherwise be barred before July 1, 1990, as a result
of expiration of the applicable period of limitations, is revived or extended.
An asbestos action revived or extended under this subdivision may be be-
gun before July 1, 1990.
Id.
93. 80 South Eighth, 486 N.W.2d at 395.
94. Id.
95. The three questions certified to the court were (1) whether Minnesota's eco-
nomic loss doctrine prevents the owner of a building with asbestos-containing fire-
proofing from suing the manufacturers of the fireproofing in tort; (2) if so, whether
Chapter 352 of the 1991 Minnesota Sessions Laws (codified at MINN. STAT. § 604.10
(1992)), which reinstated the "other property" exception for nonmerchant parties,
1993]
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the costs of maintaining, repairing, and replacing the fireproofing
were not economic losses under Hapka96 and therefore were recover-
able in tort.97
Based on the holding in Superwood as modified by Hapka, the 80
South Eighth court concluded that, if the loss suffered by the 80 South
Eighth partnership were an "economic loss," the court would be re-
quired to hold that it was not recoverable under Minnesota deci-
sional law.98 The 80 South Eighth court noted that the damages
sought by 80 South Eighth closely resembled those sought by the
Minneapolis Society of Fine Arts in the 1984 case.99 In Fine Arts, the
court held that the diminution in value of a building due to a defect
in one of its components and the cost of repairing and replacing the
defect, were "economic losses" and that damage to the building
could not be considered "other property."100
The court distinguished 80 South Eighth from Fine Arts by finding
that "economic loss" is limited to loss related to a product's failure
to perform as promised.101 Noting that commercial parties are pre-
sumed to bring experience and expectations to the contract forma-
tion process, 10 2 the 80 South Eighth court relied on language from S.J
Groves & Sons to limit the types of expectations arising from a con-
tract to those concerning suitability, quality, and performance.10 3
The court stated that the distinguishing factor in 80 South Eighth was
applies retroactively to a case initiated in 1988; and (3) if the statute applies retroac-
tively, whether it permits suits by the owner of a building with asbestos-containing
fireproofing against the manufacturer in tort for the costs of maintenance, removal,
and replacement of the fireproofing. 80 South Eighth, 486 N.W.2d at 394. The court
answered only the first of these questions.
96. 80 S. Eighth St. Ltd. Partnership v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 486 N.W.2d 393, 397
(Minn. 1992).
97. Id. at 399.
98. Id. at 396.
99. Id. (citing Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assocs. Architects,
Inc., 354 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 1984), overruled in part by Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458
N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990)).
100. Fine Arts, 354 N.W.2d at 820-2 1.
101. 80 S. Eighth St. Ltd. Partnership v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 486 N.W.2d 393,
396-97 (Minn. 1992).
102. The 80 South Eighth court noted that the underlying assumption in all its eco-
nomic loss cases
is that commercial parties bring their experiences in the marketplace to the
negotiations; that their reasonable contemplation is embodied in the trans-
action; that at the time of the contract formation they have defined the prod-
uct, identified the risks, and negotiated a price of the goods that reflects the
relative benefits and risks to each party.
Id. at 396 (citing Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683, 688 (Minn. 1990)).
103. 80 South Eighth, 486 N.W.2d at 397 (citing Sj. Groves & Sons Co. v. Aerospa-
tiale Helicopter Corp., 374 N.W.2d 431, 434 (Minn. 1985), overruled in part by Hapka
v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990)).
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that the fireproofing had not failed to perform as fireproofing.104
Had the claim been for failure to protect against fire, only contract
damages would be available because such a claim would arise from
"failure to meet expectations of suitability, quality, and perform-
ance."' 05 But, reasoned the 80 South Eighth court, the damages
sought by the plaintiffs were related to efforts to eliminate the risk of
injury and make the building safe for those using the property; there-
fore the damages were not "economic losses."10 6
In 80 South Eighth, the court began the process of discrediting
"economic loss" as a meaningful tool in analyzing future cases where
tort and contract theories of recovery collided. While previous eco-
nomic loss cases focused on the contrast between commercial and
consumer transactions, o7 80 South Eighth ignored this distinction.
Instead, the court focused on the product involved to determine the
appropriate remedy without explicitly recognizing an exception to
the economic loss rule.
B. Lloyd F. Smith-Death by Footnote
Only four months later, in Lloyd F. Smith Co. v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., the
Minnesota Supreme Court attempted to clarify the language of 80
South Eighth and to reconcile that holding with its previous economic
loss decisions.108 On January 15, 1988, a fire in the office of Dr.
Thomas Vukodinovich caused substantial damage to a building
owned by the Lloyd F. Smith Company. The fire also damaged the
property of Dr. Vukodinovich and the property of three other ten-
ants in the building.109 The fire was allegedly caused by a defect in
the motor of a dental chair purchased third-hand by Dr. Vukodi-
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 80 S. Eighth St. Ltd. Partnership v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 486 N.W.2d 393, 397
(Minn. 1992). The 80 South Eighth court provided two policy justifications for its
decision. First, the court stated that, while a manufacturer should not be liable in tort
for failure of its product to meet the performance expectations of its customer's busi-
ness, it could and should be held liable for producing a product that creates an un-
reasonable risk of harm. Id. at 398 (citing Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145,
151 (Cal. 1965)). Tort law, stated the court, has as one of its objectives the deter-
rence of such risks. Id. at 398. Accordingly, the court's decision will encourage
building owners to take steps to protect the public by eliminating asbestos contami-
nation. Id. Second, the court justified its decision on the basis of the revival statute.
Id. at 398-99. The revival statue, the court contended, was an express direction of
legislative intent that "asbestos removal claims be treated differently from claims of
economic loss which fall under the Uniform Commercial Code." Id. at 399.
107. See, e.g., Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990).
108. 491 N.W.2d 11 (Minn. 1992).
109. Lloyd F. Smith, 491 N.W.2d at 12-13.
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novich."to After the fire, the owner of the building, Dr. Vukodi-
novich, the other tenants, and a dentist for whom Dr. Vukodinovich
was storing property, brought tort and breach of warranty claims
against the manufacturer of the chair, Den-Tal-Ez, Inc. and the man-
ufacturer of the motor, Emerson Electric, Inc.Il
The trial court concluded that the damages being sought were for
"other property" arising from a commercial transaction so that the
Uniform Commercial Code provided the exclusive remedy.112 The
trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed because the Code's four-
year statute of limitations had run on the breach of warranty
claim., 13
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Dr.
Vukodinovich was not a merchant with respect to dental chairs and
because the other plaintiffs were not parties to a commercial transac-
tion related to the chair, recovery in tort was appropriate.14 The
court noted that the definition of a commercial transaction, for pur-
poses of determining whether the appropriate recovery lies in tort or
in contract, is narrow, including only those transactions that involve
merchants in goods of the kind sold."15
The Lloyd F. Smith case offered the court an opportunity to clarify
the type of damages recoverable in tort. The court noted that the
damages sought by the plaintiffs were clearly "other property"'16
damages recoverable under Superwood 17 but apparently not recover-
able since the modification of the "other property" exception in
Hapka.118 Rather, the case turned on the nature of the underlying
sale transaction.' 19
110. Id. at 13. The chair was originally purchased from Den-Tal-Ez prior to 1975.
At least 13 years had elapsed between manufacture of the chair and the fire. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 13.
113. Lloyd F. Smith Co. v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 11, 13 (Minn. 1992)
(citing Lloyd F. Smith Co. v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., 478 N.W.2d 510 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991)).
114. Id. at 16-17.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 13.
117. Lloyd F. Smith Co. v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., 478 N.W.2d 510 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991) (citing Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn.
1981), overruled in part by Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990)).
118. Id. (citing Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683, 688 (Minn. 1990)). The
plaintiffs did not seek recovery under MINN. STAT. § 604.10 (1992), which allows tort
recovery for damage to other property provided the plaintiff is not a merchant in
goods of the kind sold, because the statute was passed while the case was on appeal.
Lloyd F. Smith, 491 N.W.2d at 17 n.7. The court did not address whether the statute
applied retroactively in Lloyd F. Smith after it found an alternate basis for recovery. Id.
119. Lloyd F. Smith, 491 N.W.2d at 11. The defendants argued that the original
sale of the chair was a commercial transaction because the sellers were manufacturing
[Vol. 19
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The Lloyd F. Smith court began its analysis by referring to three
methods used by courts throughout the country to analyze whether
the Uniform Commercial Code warranty provisions are the exclusive
remedy.' 20 The first method focuses on the status of the parties.121
In these cases, warranty remedies apply when the parties are sophis-
ticated commercial entities or merchants.122 The second set of cases
focuses on the nature of the risk.123 Tort recovery is allowed when
the defective product is "unreasonably dangerous from a safety
standpoint, not just defective from a performance or quality stand-
point." 24 The final set of cases focuses on the injury-producing
event.125 Under this reasoning, tort recovery is permitted where the
damage results from a "sudden and calamitous occurrence."'
2 6
While the court found these approaches useful in determining
whether only tort or contract remedies are available, they were of
limited use in determining whether contract remedies should be ex-
clusive when both tort and contract remedies may be appropriate.
2 7
In these circumstances, courts must ask whether the loss sought is an
"economic loss" or a loss arising from a commercial transaction to
determine whether allowing concurrent tort and warranty recovery
would undermine the Uniform Commercial Code.128 In footnote
concerns and the buyer purchased the chair for use in his business. Id. at 13. They
further argued that, because the liberal privity standards adopted by the legislature in
Minnesota's version of the Uniform Commercial Code afford warranty protection to
subpurchasers, recovery should be limited to losses based on breach of warranty. Id.
See MINN. STAT. § 336.2-318 (1992) (providing that warranty protection extends to
any person injured due to breach of warranty if that person is reasonably expected to
be affected by the goods). Finally, the defendants noted that the court of appeals had
twice held that other property damages resulting from defects in products purchased
secondhand were not recoverable in tort. Lloyd F. Smith, 491 N.W.2d at 13 (citing
Nelson v. International Harvester Corp., 394 N.W.2d 578, 581 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986); TCF Bank & Savings, F.A., v. Marshall Truss Sys., Inc., 466 N.W.2d 49 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1991)). Dr. Vukodinovich argued that he was only a "casual buyer" of the
chair, acquired when he purchased the practice of another dentist. The other plain-
tiffs noted that they had no connection with the chair other than being in the same
office building. Lloyd F. Smith, 491 N.W.2d at 14.
120. Lloyd F. Smith, 491 N.W.2d at 14.
121. Id.
122. Lloyd F. Smith Co. v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 11, 14 (Minn. 1992)
(citing Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683, 688 (Minn. 1990); S.J. Groves &
Sons Co. v. Aerospatiale Helicopter Corp., 374 N.W.2d 431, 434 (Minn. 1985)).
123. Id. at 14 (citing 80 S. Eighth St. Ltd. Partnership v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 486
N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1992)).
124. Lloyd F. Smith, 491 N.W.2d at 14.
125. Id. at 14.
126. Id. (citing SJ. Groves & Sons Co. v. Aerospatiale Helicopter Corp., 374
N.W.2d 431, 435 (Minn. 1985) (rejecting the "sudden and calamitous occurrence"
exception)).
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five, the court noted that, when damages resulting from a defective
product "are recoverable in a breach of warranty action, they are
called an 'economic loss' but when recovered in a tort action they are
said to be non-economic damages. Thus the term 'economic loss' is
a useful shorthand phrase in the law of sales for contract damages
"129
Further, the court stated that, in reviewing cases where tort and
contract overlap, the issue becomes not whether a particular loss is
economic but rather under what theory the loss should be recover-
able.130 The court then proceeded to set forth the analysis to be
applied in future cases where tort and contract overlap.131 The court
noted that where the injury results from damage to the property
purchased, warranty law governs all recovery, including costs of re-
pairing the product and lost profits due to the inability to use the
product.132 When the injury is damage to "other property", how-
ever, the focus is on the status of the buyer relative to the seller.133
For third parties injured by a defective product, tort remedies are
appropriate.a34 The court concluded that the Uniform Commercial
Code provided exclusive remedies for "other property" only when
the damage arose out of a sale that fit "Hapka's narrow definition of a
'commercial transaction.' "135
IV. ANALYSIS
A. 80 South Eighth-Narrow Precedents Make Bad Law
The 80 South Eighth decision is inconsistent with prior Minnesota
cases discussing the economic loss doctrine. The economic loss doc-
trine, as it evolved in Minnesota since its inception in Superwood Corp.
129. Id. at 14 n.5. Footnote five states:
The term "economic loss," we might add, can be somewhat confusing, if not
understood in context. Damages for loss of property and for consequential
damages caused by a defective product are generally recoverable, at least in
this state, either by a breach of warranty action or a tort action .... When
these damages are recoverable in a breach of warranty action, they are
called an "economic loss" but when recovered in a tort action they are said
to be noneconomic damages. Thus the term "economic loss" is a useful
shorthand phrase in the law of sales for contract damages, but it is no help
in determining whether a contract or tort remedy should apply to a particu-
lar set of facts.
Id. (citations omitted).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 15-17.
132, Lloyd F. Smith Co. v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 11, 15 (Minn. 1992).
133. Id. at 16-17.
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v. Siempelkamp Corp. ,136 was simply not meant to apply to cases involv-
ing products, such as asbestos, that are widely used but also highly
dangerous.137 In the past, the court consistently emphasized that
the role of the economic loss doctrine was to preserve the integrity
of the Uniform Commercial Code.' 3 8 Accordingly, the court fo-
cused primarily on the nature of the underlying transaction. In those
cases involving a transaction between a commercial buyer and seller,
there was no recovery in tort, regardless of the type of injury or the
nature of the property damaged.13 9
In 80 South Eighth, the court presumably compromised its original
intent of preserving the distinction between tort and contract and
permitted recovery. The decision in 80 South Eighth contains numer-
ous citations to cases involving asbestos removal from schools and
other publicly owned buildings. 140 Perhaps the court was compelled
to permit tort recovery in 80 South Eighth because of a concern for a
public entity's ability to recover the costs associated with asbestos
abatement.
In addition, narrowly tailored precedent limited the court's op-
tions in 80 South Eighth. Therefore the court was forced to adopt a
new definition of "economic loss" because the common law "other
property" exception had been modified by Hapka.14l Reliance on
the statutory "other property" exception was not an alternative be-
136. 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 198 1), overruled in part by Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458
N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990).
137. Although W.R. Grace disputed the danger of asbestos in fireproofing, the 80
S. Eighth court appears to have accepted that the fireproofing material was danger-
ous. 80 S. Eighth St. Ltd. Partnership v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 486 N.W.2d 393, 398
(Minn. 1992). This position is interesting in light of the disputed nature of the claim
and the procedural posture of the case. The case arose from a summary judgment
motion by Grace. Accordingly, the court was required to construe the facts in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party (here, the 80 South Eighth Street part-
nership). Nord v. Herreid, 305 N.W.2d 337, 339 (Minn. 1981) (quoting Sauter v.
Sauter, 70 N.W.2d 351, 353 (Minn. 1955)). The court never mentioned this require-
ment in the opinion. Rather, it presented the case as though findings of fact had
been made. Grace's petition for rehearing was based in part on the court's presenta-
tion of the facts in the published decision. Grace pointed out that the court's deci-
sion presented as fact many issues which were in serious dispute and had not been
decided by a finder of fact. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 6-11, 80 S. Eighth
St. Ltd. Partnership v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 486 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1992) (No. Cl-
91-1427).
138. See, e.g., Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683, 688 (Minn. 1990); S.J.
Groves & Sons Co. v. Aerospatiale Helicopter Corp., 374 N.W.2d 431, 434 (Minn.
1985); Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assocs. Architects, Inc., 354
N.W.2d 816, 819-20 (Minn 1984); Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311
N.W.2d 159, 162 (Minn. 1981).
139. See supra note 76.
140. 80 S. Eighth St. Ltd. Partnership v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 486 N.W.2d 393, 397
(Minn. 1992).
141. The 80 South Eighth court acknowledged that if the loss was "economic," tort
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cause it conflicted with the holding in Fine Arts that damage to a
building from its components is not damage to "other property."4 2
Likewise, the court could not rely on the statutory "other property"
exception because the 80 South Eighth partnership was a merchant
with respect to real estate. If the court were to allow the partnership
recovery under the common law, the focus of the analysis would have
to change.143 The result was a decision that is inconsistent with pre-
vious Minnesota decisions.
1. Erosion of the Role of the Uniform Commercial Code
Most significantly, the treatment of the Uniform Commercial Code
in the 80 South Eighth decision represented a marked departure from
prior Minnesota economic loss doctrine cases. 144 Despite the court's
attempt to reconcile the decision with precedent, the tort recovery
permitted in 80 South Eighth was clearly inconsistent with the ration-
ale underlying the doctrine's limits on tort recovery.' 45 The
Superwood court noted that the purpose of tort law is to "fill gaps in
recovery would be precluded under Hapka. 80 S. Eighth St. Ltd. Partnership v. Ca-
rey-Canada, Inc., 486 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1992).
142. Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assoc. Architects, Inc., 354
N.W.2d 816, 820 (Minn. 1984).
143. See James E. Moore, supra note 4. Moore notes that one of the most signifi-
cant problems with the economic loss doctrine is that courts recite a definition of
"economic loss" or "other property" then fail to apply the definitions to the facts of
the case. Rather, Moore claims, the courts tend to be results oriented, with holdings
based on an unarticulated policy rather than on the definition of "economic loss" or
"other property." Moore, supra note 4, at 121. 80 South Eighth appears to be such a
case.
144. Although a comprehensive discussion of the relationship between the Uni-
form Commercial Code and common law is beyond the scope of this note, several
sections of the Code merit discussion. First, section 1-102(1) states that the Code is
to be construed and applied liberally to promote its underlying purposes. MINN.
STAT. § 336.1-102(1) (1992). Second, the primary purpose of the statute is to "sim-
plify, clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial transactions." MINN.
STAT. § 336.1-102(2)(a) (1992). Finally, it is clear that the Code was intended to dis-
place portions of the common law that relate to provisions covered by it. Section 1-
103 notes that the common law is to supplement the Code, unless it is specifically
displaced by the provisions thereof. MINN. STAT. § 336.1-103 (1992). These provi-
sions make it clear that the warranty provisions are to be liberally applied to supplant
tort claims for product defects, at least in commercial transactions.
145. The 80 South Eighth court cited one of the most often repeated passages from
Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965) in support of its position that tort
recovery is appropriate. The passage from Seely noted that the distinction between
tort and contract recovery is not based on the presence or absence of personal injury.
Rather, the nature of the manufacturer's responsibility is the critical factor. Manufac-
turers, it was said, are not liable in tort for failure of the product to meet perform-
ance expectations. They are liable if the goods create an unreasonable risk of harm,
with harm measured from a safety standard. Seely, 403 P.2d at 151. The Minnesota
Supreme Court then stated that asbestos may create an unreasonable risk of harm,
and therefore, tort recovery was appropriate. 80 South Eighth, 486 N.W.2d at 398.
[Vol. 19
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the law of sales with respect to consumer purchasers."146 Thus, in
S.J Groves & Sons, the court noted that strict liability should be lim-
ited to consumer actions.147 The emphasis in strict liability is on
protecting consumers who are not equipped to bargain or to protect
themselves from unreasonable risks. Another purpose of tort law is
deterrence of unreasonable risks of harm. 148
Moreover, with the exception of strict liability, tort theories of lia-
bility require a showing of fault. The danger of applying strict liabil-
ity in a commercial setting, especially in the absence of a showing of
fault, is that it imposes open-ended liability for an indefinite time, to
an indeterminate class and thereby prevents closure on commercial
transactions.149 This is particularly true in a case such as 80 South
Eighth where there is no realized personal injury.150
Contract and Uniform Commercial Code warranty law, on the
other hand, are intended to cover all commercial transactions.151 In
Hapka, the court noted that parties to commercial transactions are
expected to be knowledgeable and of relatively equal bargaining
power. Warranties are, therefore, to be negotiated at the time of
contract formation. The price paid should reflect the agreed upon
allocation of risk.152 The Hapka court also noted that opening the
door to tort recovery at a later date is simply an attempt to defeat the
parameters that were established at the time of contract formation.
146. Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Minn.
1981), overruled in part by Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990).
147. S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Aerospatiale Helicopter Corp., 374 N.W.2d 431,
433 (Minn. 1985), overruled in part by Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn.
1990). The view that strict liability should be limited to consumer actions is not
unique. Indeed, the emphasis in Seely was on protecting consumers from unreasona-
ble risk of harm. See David E. Bland & Robert M. Wattson, Property Damage Caused By
Defective Products: What Losses are Recoverable, 9 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1, 7 (1983).
Bland and Wattson note that several courts have focused on the kind of danger in
determining whether to permit tort recovery. Id. at 8-10. This analysis was criticized
by the Minnesota Supreme Court in S.J Groves & Sons, 374 N.W.2d at 434-35.
148. 80 S. Eighth St. Ltd. Partnership v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 486 N.W.2d 393, 398
(Minn. 1992).
149. See, e.g., Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931).
150. The court specifically acknowledged that no personal injuries had occurred
at the time the suit was filed. 80 South Eighth, 486 N.W.2d at 398. Rather, the plain-
tiff was allowed to recover for potential future injuries to parties whose only relation-
ship to the plaintiff was that of a customer or an employee of the plaintiffs tenants.
151. Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683, 688 (Minn. 1990). In Hapka, the
court noted that the Uniform Commercial Code indicates that it is intended to dis-
place tort law. The Uniform Commercial Code allows incidental and consequential
damages, including damages for injury to persons or property proximately resulting
from breach. MINN. STAT. §§ 336.2-714(3), -715(2) (1992). The court also noted
that exclusion of personal injury liability from warranty coverage in the purchase of
consumer goods is per se unconscionable. Hapka, 458 N.W.2d at 688.
152. Hapka, 458 N.W.2d at 688.
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The need for certainty and finality in commercial transactions makes
such a result unacceptable.15 3 Accordingly, the court noted in Hapka
that there is no basis "in cases of property damage arising out of
commercial transactions to heap tort theories of negligence and
strict products liability atop those remedies already provided by the
U.C.C." 154
The facts of 80 South Eighth clearly point to imposing only contract
liability. The 80 South Eighth partnership was a commercial entity
that purchased the building in a commercial transaction from the
prior owner. The prior owner was also a commercial entity,155 and
contracting for the construction of the building was certainly a com-
mercial transaction. The general partner undoubtedly had signifi-
cant experience in purchasing and managing buildings and should
not be allowed to profit from its failure to negotiate allocation of the
risk that asbestos would be present.
2. Implied Warranty of Merchantability
Although the 80 South Eighth court superficially acknowledged the
inconsistency of its decision with prior case law, the court failed to
address the role of the implied warranty of merchantability con-
tained in the Uniform Commercial Code.156 The warranty of
merchantability requires that goods must be "fit for the ordinary
purposes for which [they] are used."15 7 Intuitively, a product that
performs a usually harmless function in a dangerous manner could
not be fit for its ordinary purposes. The court's failure to explain
why the protection offered by the Uniform Commercial Code's im-
plied warranty of merchantability did not provide adequate protec-
tion in a case involving sophisticated commercial parties ignores the
spirit of the Superwood line of decisions that emphasized the court's
desire to preserve a large role for the Uniform Commercial Code.158
153. Id. The California Court of Appeals proposed a four-part test for determin-
ing whether strict liability or contract damages should apply. Kaiser Steel Corp. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 127 Cal. Rptr. 838 (Ct. App. 1976). The test noted that
contract damages are appropriate in cases where the parties deal in a commercial
setting, the parties are of nearly equal bargaining strength, the parties actually bar-
gain, and the parties bargain about the allocation of the risk of loss. Id. at 845.
Although this approach has merit, it requires the courts to investigate the contract
formation process in great detail. Moreover, its fact specific nature sacrifices efficient
administration of justice.
154. Hapka, 458 N.W.2d at 688.
155. The limited partnership purchased the building from Oxford Development
Minnesota, Inc., which remained as general partner. Oxford in turn purchased the
IDS Center from IDS Properties. Brief of Respondent at 10, 80 S. Eighth St. Ltd.
Partnership v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 468 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1992) (No. CI-91-1427).
156. MINN. STAT. § 336.2-314 (1992).
157. MINN. STAT. § 336.2-314(2)(c) (1992).
158. See, e.g., Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990); S.J. Groves &
[Vol. 19
24
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 4 [1993], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol19/iss4/2
ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE
3. Irreconcilable Definitions of Economic Loss
The definition of "economic loss" contained in 80 South Eighth is
also inconsistent with the definition set forth in Fine Arts.159 Many
courts have defined "economic loss" as including diminution in
value, the cost of repairing the defect, the cost of replacing the defec-
tive product, and damages for loss of use of the product.160 In Fine
Arts, the court noted that failure to apply this definition in cases
where a component of a building has failed would "emasculate the
U.C.C. provisions as they apply to component suppliers."161
In 80 South Eighth, the court acknowledged that the losses sought
fell squarely within the definition of "economic loss" set forth in Fine
Arts;' 62 nevertheless, it developed a new analysis in the 80 South
Eighth. Here, the court declared that "economic loss" would only
include loss resulting from a product's failure to perform as prom-
ised.163 Because the fireproofing had not failed to protect against
fire, but rather had performed in an unsafe manner, the loss was not
"'economic."164 The court did not address the concerns it expressed
in Fine Arts that applying a definition of economic loss that excluded
the costs of repairing and replacing defective components to a build-
ing situation would emasculate the Uniform Commercial Code as to
component suppliers. 165
4. The "Unreasonably Dangerous Product" Exception
Creating an exception to the economic loss doctrine for unreason-
Sons Co. v. Aerospatiale Helicopter Corp., 374 N.W.2d 431 (Minn. 1985); Minneap-
olis Soc'y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assocs. Architects, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 816
(Minn. 1984); Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn.
1981).
159. Fine Arts, 354 N.W.2d at 820-21.
160. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 449 (I11.
1982); Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assocs. Architects, Inc., 354
N.W.2d 816, 820-21 (Minn. 1984); Washington Water Power Co. v. Graybar Elec.
Co., 774 P.2d 1199, 1207 (Wash. 1989); Northridge Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co. 471
N.W.2d 179, 181 (Wis. 1991); see also Barrett supra note 5, at 892 n.l, 895; Moore
supra note 4, at 114-15; Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM.
L. REV. 917, 918 (1966).
161. Fine Arts, 354 N.W.2d at 819 (citing Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp.,
311 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Minn. 1981)).
162. 80 S. Eighth St. Ltd. Partnership v. Carey Canada, Inc., 486 N.W.2d 393, 396
(Minn. 1992).
163. Id.
164 Id. at 396-97. Grace disputes much of the evidence offered by the plaintiff in
support of the plaintiffs contention that the asbestos presents a hazard in its undis-
turbed state, and therefore, that it is unreasonably dangerous. Petition for Rehearing
of Defendant-Appellant at 7-11, 80 S. Eighth St. Ltd. Partnership v. Carey-Canada,
Inc. 486 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1992) (No. CI-91-1427).
165. Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assocs. Architects, Inc., 354
N.W.2d 816, 819 (Minn. 1984).
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ably dangerous products would have required the court to overrule
prior decisions.166 The 80 South Eighth court flirted with the idea,
noting that asbestos was a dangerous product.167 The court also
considered another alternative. The court pointed to the revival
statute, which altered the statute of limitations for asbestos actions,
as evidence that the legislature had considered asbestos unique and
worthy of different treatment. 68 However, the court ultimately
grounded its decision in the language of the existing economic loss
doctrine, holding that replacement of asbestos is not an "economic
loss."169 This holding was based on the court's conclusion that the
risk that a building would be contaminated with asbestos was simply
not the type of risk that parties would bargain over in a commercial
transaction. 1 70
The court did not address the possibility that when the 80 South
Eighth partnership purchased the building it may have paid a lower
price as a result of such risk.171 If the price was reduced because of
the presence of asbestos, the court's decision resulted in the plaintiff
receiving a better bargain from the courts than it could receive from
the prior owner.
5. Recovery for Potential Injury to Another
The 80 South Eighth decision also failed to discuss why the 80
South Eighth partnership, rather than the person who eventually suf-
fers injury from asbestos, should be entitled to a tort recovery. The
asbestos contained in the IDS Center threatens harm to the custom-
ers and tenants as well as the buyer. However, because there is no
166. See Thofson v. Redex Indus., Inc., 433 N.W.2d 901 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
167. 80 South Eighth, 486 N.W.2d at 398.
168. 80 S. Eighth St. Ltd. Partnership v. Carey-Canada, Inc. 486 N.W.2d 393, 398
(Minn. 1992).
169. Id. at 397.
170. Id. at 396. The court cited several cases which it claimed supported its con-
clusion that persons acquiring property do not bargain over the risk associated with
asbestos. Id. at 397-98. There is, however, a significant distinction between the
plaintiffs in the cited cases and the 80 South Eighth case plaintiff. The position of the
court may be valid with respect to the plaintiff who hires a contractor to construct a
new building or a school district or municipality with little experience in constructing
buildings. However, the 80 South Eighth partnership is not such a party. The gen-
eral partner was a sophisticated commercial real estate development company.
171. In its brief, W.R. Grace contends that the plaintiff knew that the building's
fireproofing contained asbestos. Appellant's Brief at 8-11, 80 South Eighth St. Ltd.
Partnership v. Carey Canada, Inc., 486 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1992) (No. CI-91-1427).
If this is the case, the court could conclude that either a reduced price was paid based
on the risk or the plaintiff paid full price assuming that it would recover the cost of
abating and replacing the asbestos in an action such as this. It is not the role of the
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threat of physical harm to the partnership, the only real harm to it is
the cost of replacement.
It is not at all clear how the court would distinguish this case from
SJ Groves & Sons, where the purchaser of the goods did not suffer
personal injury. In S.J Groves & Sons, the court stated that "even if a
tort injury arose out of the same occurrence, Groves did not suffer it,
rather Groves lost only what it purchased."172
The 80 South Eighth court attempted to justify its holding by noting
that the long latent period of asbestos related diseases would make it
unfair to require a plaintiff to wait until an injury occurs to permit
recovery.t73 This assertion, however, does not address the real is-
sue. The logic of S.J Groves & Sons suggests that those at risk should
recover, not a purchaser of defective goods who sustains no personal
injury. Allowing the partnership to recover merely permits it to
profit from a potential future injury to its tenants and their custom-
ers. A more equitable solution would be to require the defendant to
establish a trust fund to be administered for the benefit of future
victims.
Also, allowing tort recovery to a commercial entity based on the
risk of a future personal injury to a yet unidentified party, with an
unknown relationship to the plaintiff, creates several problems.
First, it is inconsistent with the usual requirement that damage occur
before negligence is actionable. 174 Second, because the damage has
not yet occurred, both the existence and the extent of damage is
"wholly speculative."175 Third, there is no mechanism to ensure
that the recovery by the plaintiff bears a reasonable relationship to
the risk that exists or the harm that occurs. 176
6. Application of the Statutory "Other Property" Exception
The Minnesota courts have construed the "other property" defini-
tion very narrowly.177 In 80 South Eighth, the plaintiffs sought to re-
place the fireproofing-not the damages to the building itself.178
172. S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Aerospatiale Helicopter Corp., 374 N.W.2d 431,
434 (Minn. 1985), overruled in part by Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn.
1990).
173. 80 S. Eighth St. Ltd. Partnership v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 486 N.W.2d 393, 398
(Minn. 1992).
174. See Barrett, supra note 5 at 918-19.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assocs. Architects,
Inc., 354 N.W.2d 816, 820 (Minn. 1984), overruled in part by Hapka v. Paquin Farms,
458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990); Thofson v. Redex Indus., Inc. 433 N.W.2d 901, 903-
04 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).




Brunmeier: Death by Footnote: The Life and Times of Minnesota's Economic Los
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1993
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
The court acknowledged that the damages sought by the plaintiff
closely resembled those sought by the plaintiff in Fine Arts, and there-
fore could not be considered "other property." 7 9
Even if the property damage were determined to fall within the
statutory property exception, the 80 South Eighth partnership could
not recover under this exception. In order to preserve a place for
the Uniform Commercial Code in sales of goods used in construc-
tion, the court would have to determine merchant status relative to
the building as a whole rather than simply the component parts. If
merchant status were determined on the basis of component parts,
only the sellers of components could be considered merchants in any
kind of building. Such a result would provide that the many sophisti-
cated individuals and entities who invest in numerous commercial
real estate projects would not be considered merchants with respect
to the component parts. To characterize such entities as
nonmerchants would emasculate the Uniform Commercial Code in
the area of commercial real estate development by allowing tort re-
covery whenever a component of a building failed. Based on the ac-
tivities of Oxford Development, the general partner in the 80 South
Eighth partnership and a large commercial real estate manager and
developer, the plaintiff in 80 South Eighth must be considered a
merchant in commercial building for purposes of the statute. Failing
to do so would create so large a loophole in the definition of
"merchant," as to render the definition virtually meaningless.
The facts of 80 South Eighth are easily distinguishable from asbes-
tos cases involving school districts or other public entities because
the recovery could be related not to the product but rather to the
merchant status of the parties. Thus, the court's departure from pre-
cedent was unnecessary. While imposing strict liability may en-
courage the property owner to remove asbestos,180 it is more likely
to create a windfall for the partnership, which may have paid a lower
price for the property than it would have paid for an asbestos-free
building. What the 80 South Eighth case did create was an uncertainty
as to the focus of future economic loss cases.
B. Lloyd F. Smith Co.-The Court's Framework for the Future of
Economic Loss in Minnesota
As a result of the court's redefining "economic loss" in 80 South
Eighth, the focus of the analysis in future cases is unclear. The 80
South Eighth decision purported to leave prior case law, all of which
179. Id. at 396.
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had focused on the nature of the sale transaction, intact.181 At the
same time, however, it suggested that courts should focus not only
on the nature of the underlying sale transaction but on the product
itself. 182
Some clarification came four months after 80 South Eighth, when
the Minnesota Supreme Court decided Lloyd F. Smith Co. v. Den-Tal-
Ez, Inc. 183 The Lloyd F. Smith court returned to its previous emphasis
on the nature of the underlying transaction as the basis for determin-
ing the appropriate remedy and also clarified, in footnote five, that
the real issue confronting the courts in economic loss cases was not
whether the loss was economic but whether recovery in tort would be
consistent with the spirit of the Uniform Commercial Code.184 By
implicitly recognizing that Minnesota has adopted the "unreasonably
dangerous product" exception as a basis for finding that recovery
lies in tort, the court dispelled the illusion that the cost of replacing
asbestos is not an "economic loss."185
More importantly, the Lloyd F. Smith court presented a framework
for analyzing cases bordering on tort and contract that focuses on
the nature of the underlying transaction.186 The framework and its
exceptions are consistent both with the language of the Uniform
Commercial Code and the goal of protecting society from unreason-
ably dangerous products.18 7 Nevertheless, the framework is incom-
plete because it does not explicitly provide a definition of "other
property" or address cases where elements of both a commercial and
a consumer transaction are present.
The court's new approach involves a three-part analysis. First, if
the product is "unreasonably dangerous," full recovery in tort is
available. To date, asbestos has been declared an "unreasonably
dangerous" product,188 but the court has not provided any indica-
tion of what standards are to be used to determine whether a prod-
uct is "unreasonably dangerous." The court did not explicitly adopt
the "unreasonably dangerous" product characterization as a basis
for recovery in either 80 South Eighth or Lloyd F. Smith. However, the
inference that this basis for recovery has been adopted in Minnesota
181. Id. at 396.
182. Id. at 397.
183. 491 N.W.2d 11 (Minn. 1992).
184. Id. at 14 n.5.
185. Id. at 14.
186. Id.
187. The court apparently continued to believe that even commercial plaintiffs
who suffer only economic injury should recover for "unreasonably dangerous prod-
ucts." Lloyd F. Smith, 491 N.W.2d at 14.
188. Lloyd F. Smith, Co. v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 11, 14 (Minn. 1992)
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is essential if 80 South Eighth is to be interpreted consistently with the
Lloyd F. Smith holding.
In Lloyd F. Smith, the court held that the Uniform Commercial
Code provides the exclusive remedy for "other property" damages
that arise from a "sale of goods only when that sale fits Hapka's nar-
row definition of a 'commercial transaction,' i.e. where the parties to
the sale are . . . 'merchants in goods of the kind.' "189 The court
further explained that actions for damage to the defective product
itself are always limited to Uniform Commercial Code remedies.190
As noted previously, the plaintiff in 80 South Eighth would have to be
considered a merchant in commercial building.1t1 Accordingly, re-
gardless of whether the damage is to "other property" or to the
product itself, the partnership could not recover except under an ex-
ception to the general rule.192
The second part of this analysis relates to whether recovery is
sought for the goods purchased. If so, recovery is limited to contract
damages, regardless of whether the original transaction was "com-
mercial" or "consumer" oriented.193 In these cases, the loss results
from failure of the product to meet the bargained for expecta-
tions.194 The language of the Uniform Commercial Code clearly
provides protection to consumer transactions. To permit tort recov-
ery in these circumstances would override the warranty agreement
and create excessive risk exposures for sellers.t95
Once these exceptions to the general rule are eliminated, the semi-
nal question becomes whether the underlying transaction was a com-
mercial transaction or a consumer transaction.196 If the underlying
transaction is a consumer transaction, damage to "other property" is
recoverable in tort.197 Alternatively, if the underlying transaction is
a commercial transaction, no recovery for damage to "other prop-
erty" is allowed.198
Consumers are permitted a tort recovery for several reasons.
First, the court noted that consumers frequently lack the bargaining
experience of merchants and therefore should be allowed a full
range of remedies.199 The court noted that consumer losses can be
189. Lloyd F. Smith, 491 N.W.2d at 17.
190. Id.
191. See supra note 87.
192. See MINN. STAT. § 604.10 (1992).
193. Lloyd F. Smith Co. v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 11, 17 (Minn. 1992).
194. Id.
195. Lloyd F. Smith, 491 N.W.2d at 17. The court made it clear that the exclusivity
also governs consequential damages. Id.
196. Id. at 15.
197. Lloyd F. Smith Co. v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 11, 17 (Minn. 1992).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 15 (citing Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683, 688 (Minn. 1990)).
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substantial and the consumer is both ill-equipped to cope with the
loss and to protect against it.200 Allowing tort recovery for a con-
sumer in this instance does not conflict with the purposes of the Uni-
form Commercial Code.20I
Another policy reason given for permitting consumers to recover
relates to the different statutes of limitations for tort and contract
suits.202 Although the statute of limitations for tort actions in Min-
nesota is only two years longer than that for Uniform Commercial
Code actions,203 the statutes start to run at significantly different
times. In Uniform Commercial Code actions for breach of warranty,
the statute starts to run at the time the goods are delivered. 204 In
tort actions, the statute does not start until the injury occurs. 20 5 The
Lloyd F. Smith court noted that the interest in compensating the in-
jured outweighs the need for a short limitation on commercial trans-
actions so that tort recovery is appropriate in consumer
transactions.206 In addition, consumers may be less likely to detect a
latent defect in a product's design during the Uniform Commercial
Code warranty period than are sophisticated commercial parties.
In summary, the court's framework provides that if the damages
sought are for an "unreasonably dangerous" product, tort recovery
is available regardless of the status of the plaintiff. If the recovery
sought is for damage to the goods, including damages for repair,
replacement, and loss of use of the product, recovery in tort is un-
available. Finally, if the recovery sought is for damage to "other
property," consumers are entitled to recover while merchants in
goods of the kind are not.
C. A Proposal for Improving the Long Term Viability of the New
Framework
The court's framework is incomplete and must be supplemented
The court referred in both cases to the example of a defective coffee pot which sets
fire to a building, resulting in a significant loss to "other property." In this hypothet-
ical, the court noted, it would be unjust to limit the consumer's recovery to warranty
based remedies. Id.
200. Lloyd F. Smith, 491 N.W.2d at 15.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 16.
203. Id. The statute of limitations in Minnesota for tort actions is six years. MINN.
STAT. § 541.05 (1992). The statute of limitations for U.C.C. claims is four years.
MINN. STAT. § 336.2-725(1) (1992).
204. MINN. STAT. § 336.2-725(2) (1992).
205. Lloyd F. Smith Co. v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 11, 16 (Minn. 1992).
206. Id. The court discussed this issue with respect to personal injuries and used
this language to support its holding in 80 South Eighth. The court also noted that
damage to a home or personal property is sufficiently similar to personal injury to
permit the extended statute of limitations. Id.
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for long term viability. The Lloyd F. Smith court addressed the appro-
priate remedy in cases where the purchaser was clearly commercial
or clearly consumer. The holding implied that, in certain cases, a
person acquiring goods for use in a business may be treated as a
consumer. The court did not, however, address how it would deter-
mine when such a transaction was a consumer transaction. In addi-
tion, the court did not discuss the appropriate definition of "other
property" to be applied in future cases. If the new framework is to
be useful to practitioners and the court, it must be supplemented
with a more detailed discussion of these issues.
1. Supplements to the Court's Framework
The language of Lloyd F. Smith can be used to derive a test for
distinguishing between commercial and consumer transactions in
those cases where either position is equally viable. In treating the
dentist in Lloyd F. Smith as a consumer, the court suggested that fu-
ture economic loss cases would apply a "narrow definition of 'com-
mercial transactions.' "207 Here, the dentist was a "casual buyer" 208
of dental chairs. However, the court did not indicate whether the
dentist would be treated as a commercial party under other
circumstances.
A distinction between occasional purchases for use in a business
and regular business purchases is necessary. The dentist or farmer
making an occasional purchase resembles a consumer more than a
merchant, regardless of whether the product is used in a business.
The casual buyer is a small customer who is unlikely to have signifi-
cant bargaining power relative to the seller. For the same reason,
the casual buyer's knowledge of the product is likely to be substan-
tially less than that of the seller. Accordingly, when making these
purchases, the businessperson who is a casual buyer should be
treated as a consumer.
Conversely, where a businessperson, such as the dentist in Lloyd F.
Smith or the farmer in Thofson,209 is purchasing a product that he or
she uses in a business and purchases on a regular basis, the transac-
tion is more commercial in nature and should be treated as such.
Here the buyer may have greater bargaining power because of more
frequent and higher quantity purchases. Moreover, the purchaser's
207. Id. at 17. The court noted that only transactions involving merchants in
goods of the kind are considered commercial transactions.
208. For purposes of this discussion, a "casual buyer" is one making a rare rather
than a regular purchase. Thus a farmer buying a silo or a grain dryer, presumably a
rare occurrence, would be treated as a consumer. That same farmer buying seed, a
regular purchase, would be treated as a merchant.
209. Thofson v. Redex Indus. Inc., 433 N.W.2d 901 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
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knowledge of the product is likely to more closely approximate that
of the seller. In these cases merchant treatment is appropriate.
The result of applying the Lloyd F. Smith framework with the addi-
tion of the "casual buyer" distinction is that many parties not for-
merly allowed to recover for damage to "other property" will be
allowed to do so. This expansion of the availability of tort recovery
may be illusory, however, because the court has left unaddressed the
extent to which it will expand the definition of "other property."
Adherence to the current conception of "other property" as outlined
in Thofson will severely limit the effectiveness and life span of this new
framework.
The Minnesota courts have consistently defined damage to "other
property" as that which is not in the contemplation of the parties. 2 10
Thus, in Thofson, the court of appeals held that grain damaged by a
fire in a grain dryer was not recoverable in tort.211 Yet, the farmer in
Thofson had no more bargaining power with the manufacturer than
did the original purchasers of the dentist's chair in the Lloyd F. Smith
case. Likewise, the destruction of grain from the fire in the grain
dryer is not significantly different than the hypothetical home fire
started by the defective coffee pot cited as a clearly recoverable in
tort in both Lloyd F. Smith212 and Hapka.2 13
The court's focus on the nature of the transaction to determine
whether "other property" is recoverable should be incorporated into
the analysis of what constitutes "other property." When purchasing
goods, consumers do not generally consider whether the product
might damage something commonly used in conjunction with it. Ac-
cordingly, the definition of "other property" should include every-
thing except the product actually purchased in the sale transaction.
This is consistent with the goals outlined by existing case law and
Minnesota statutory law because only parties that are not merchants
in goods of the kind may recover "other property" damages. 214
210. See, e.g., Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683, 688 (Minn. 1990); Minne-
apolis Soc'y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assocs. Architects, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 816,
820 (Minn. 1984).
211. Thofson, 433 N.W.2d at 903.
212. Lloyd F. Smith Co. v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 11, 15 (Minn. 1992).
213. Hapka, 458 N.W.2d at 688.
214. Because recovery in tort would be limited to the damages to the "other prop-
erty," concerns related to "bootstrapping" a large recovery onto a claim for a nomi-
nal damage to "other property", cited by the court in SJ. Groves & Sons Co. v.
Aerospatiale Helicopter, Inc., 374 N.W.2d 431, 434 (Minn. 1985), overruled in part by
Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990) and Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine
Arts v. Parker-Klein Assocs. Architects, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 816, 820 (Minn. 1984), over-
ruled in part by Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990) would not be
warranted. Explicitly limiting recovery to "other property" may actually discourage
suits because only nominal damages would be available.
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V. CONCLUSION
The framework that has been gleaned from the language of Lloyd
F. Smith and supplemented by this Note, if followed, would provide a
reasonable, consistent basis for analyzing cases where both tort and
contract remedies are applicable. The framework proposed by the
court allows for recovery in tort whenever a product is unreasonably
dangerous, in contract only when losses sought are for damage to
the good itself, and in tort for damage to "other property" when the
plaintiff is a consumer. This Note proposes supplementing the
framework to extend the focus on the nature of the party in cases
involving mixed commercial and consumer transactions and to the
determination of what constitutes "other property."
The framework proposed provides a long term solution for future
cases where tort and contract appear to conflict. It is also consistent
with the requirements of Minnesota law that permit "other prop-
erty" damages to be recoverable in tort if the parties are not
merchants in goods of the kind.215 Most importantly, this framework
strikes a workable balance between the need to retain the primacy of
the Uniform Commercial Code in commercial transactions and the
need to protect consumers from defective products.
The principle threat to the framework's longevity is that the court
will continue to construe "other property" so narrowly that the new
rule will be as unworkable as the old. If the new framework is to
survive longer than the economic loss doctrine, a more reasonable
definition of "other property" must be developed.
215. MINN. STAT. § 604.10 (1992).
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